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Thesis Abstract
This thesis examines the issues and controversies that the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki caused in the United States. Four chapters all deal with different periods in the history
of these controversies. The first chapter deals with the actual decision to drop the bomb and the
American public’s initial reactions, while the second chapter deals with subsequent reactions as
the topic got more controversial. One of these topics include Henry Stimson’s article entitled
“The Decision to Use the Bomb,” which attempted to justify the use of the atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The third looks at the beginnings of the Cold War and its
consequences, including the Cuban Missile Crisis. The last chapter examines more modern
issues such as Chernobyl and the ultimate fear of nuclear war.
The most useful primary documents found for this thesis included declassified documents
during the Cold War, diaries and correspondences between leaders, and articles from those who
saw Hiroshima first hand. Many letters written between world leaders, diaries and articles
released to the public proved very helpful in figuring out just how the most powerful people in
the world were reacting to the bombings. Many of these controversies happened more than fifty
years ago including the Cuban Missile Crisis, so it is very fortunate that so many documents
from the CIA have been released to the public to enjoy. From this research I have concluded that
the history of atomic weaponry is a long and complicated one, even though it has all happened in
the 20th century. I came across many documents and books that contained shocking facts and
stories that I didn’t know were possible. We did not need to drop any nuclear weapons on Japan,
and later on, during the 60’s, we were much closer to nuclear war than many thought.
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Chapter 1: The Decision to Drop the Bomb and the Initial Reactions

The decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is one of, if not the
most scrutinized and controversial war decision ever made. From the time the war ended just
eight days after the first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, people in the United States and
around the world have contemplated other possible options to ending the war besides the utter
cruelty unleashed from the bomb. Harry Truman and his advisors had many reasons for
dropping the bomb, but all of them were not made public after the war was finally over. The
most common justification for dropping the bomb was to simply save American lives because
the invasion of Japan’s mainland would be a deadly task and hundreds of thousands more
soldiers’ lives would be lost. Some historians think that it is possible that Truman wanted to
impress the Soviet Union with the awesome power of the atomic bomb. 1 This would have given
America the edge in the coming Cold War and prove to the world that the United States is the
ultimate superpower. Truman may have also not wanted the Soviets to succeed in conquering
the Japanese mainland and showing up the Americans just as they did by getting into Berlin first.
It is also worth considering that if the Soviet Union successfully invaded Japan, they would
demand an occupation zone. The Soviet Union did officially declare war on Japan on August
9th, 1945 which was just one day before the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. 2 In this chapter, all
these theories will be discussed as well as the initial reactions in America and the military’s
cover up of the effects that the bomb’s radiation had on the people of Japan. Did the atomic
bombs really did end the war or was it Japan’s weakness in the eyes of their leaders that truly
forced them to surrender? Overall, Truman’s decision to drop the bomb was not solely justified
1
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by the desire to prevent casualties and the military did its best to cover up the harmful affect that
the bomb had on the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The overwhelming sentiment at the time was joy that the war was over. Nothing
else mattered. This was undoubtedly the case because a Gallup poll in August 1945 also
observed that from a 69 to 17 percent margin, the public thought that the construction of the
bomb was a good thing rather than a bad thing. 3 From these people polled, they were also asked
if the bombs would eventually lead to an explosion that would end the world. An astounding 27
percent said yes. So, this essentially meant that many of those who were happy with the bomb
stated that it had the potential to eventually destroy humanity and our planet. 4 This is how
enamored people were that the war was finally over. It didn’t matter how it happened at all, just
as long as it was done with. Accounts from soldiers stationed in the Pacific were even more
joyous. “Thank God for the atomic bomb,” was the statement released by a servicemen
published in Life Magazine. 5 Any serviceman in the Pacific had to feel the same way because
many assumed a full invasion of Japan involving 700,000 men was being planned. Now that the
war was over these men could go home or be part of the occupation force. There were also many
other reasons that the public felt joy due to the end of the war.
Pride in our military power and scientific accomplishment also contributed to the general
public’s feeling of American pride. We must not forget that we had already defeated Germany
so there was already a great feeling of pride and victory in the United States. People were now
playing the waiting game and hoping that the war in the Pacific would come to a quick and
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abrupt end. The victory in Europe had made Americans feel great pride in the military leaders
and one would assume that any decision they made to end the war would not be questioned. 6
People also had to feel great about the ability by American scientists to create a weapon so
decisive in the war. One of the most interesting factors was also the American belief in virtue
and true morality. We didn’t start this war; we did not carry out any atrocities. We were simply
fighting for the freedom of the world and against tyranny. There was never any outrage at the
firebombing at Dresden or in Tokyo. The common thought process among Americans was that
we were fighting the moral war and wouldn’t commit the kind of atrocities that Germany or
Japan had. 7 People at the time, however, did not know the true cruelty that the atomic bombs
had unleashed on more than 200,000 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Whatever the case,
Truman claimed that the targets were all taken out for military reasons.
Harry Truman’s first public statements on August 7th, 1945 regarding the decision to drop
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima described the city as a military base, and this strategy was solely
in an effort to “destroy Japan’s capacity to make war.” 8 Truman also stated that America was in
a life and death “race against the Germans.” 9 These assertions were however, difficult to accept
because Germany had already been defeated and the majority of people killed and hurt in the
atomic bombings were civilians, not soldiers and workers in war factories. The United States
also possessed air superiority which gave them the ability to routinely bomb factories and other
military facilities. Also, saying that the city of Hiroshima was a “military base” is irresponsible
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because it was a city with a population of over 350,000. 10 It goes without saying that the impact
of dropping a weapon like the atomic bomb would mostly harm civilians and those who had no
bearing on the war. It had been reported that Truman thought that the city was only made up of
about 60,000 people, but still the atomic bomb being dropped on a city isn’t solely for the
destruction of military establishments. 11 It sent a message to the Soviet Union and the rest of the
world that the United States had firepower like the world had never seen before. Using this kind
of bomb on so many civilians did however, deserve an explanation. When defending the
dropping of the bomb, the argument was often that it would have saved countless American
lives.
The argument that the bomb saved thousands of lives was true but not to the extent that
the military portrayed. In 1959 Harry Truman said “I wanted to save a half million on our side.
I never lost any sleep over it. 12 After the war there was an evaluation of how many lives could
have been lost if we invaded Japan’s mainland and military planners put the number between
20,000 and 46,000 lives lost. 13 The Joint War Plans Committee, which was an advising group to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised that the most likely scenario of an U.S invasion would come
from the south, starting at Kyushu and culminating in an attack on Tokyo. 14 They also theorized
that going all the way to Tokyo might not even be necessary because a victory at Kyushu would
destroy Japan’s capability to make war. The sudden claim that Truman and his advisors saved
half a million lives by dropping the bombs came out of nowhere and had no sufficient
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justification to it. There were many reasons why Americans could have believed this due to the
brutality of the war. Nonetheless, these estimates were still unbelievably high.
Looking at past battles in the Pacific made it seems less likely that we would have lost
over half a million men. There is no doubt that the island hopping strategy had become
tremendously bloody and the battles at Iwo Jima and Okinawa were perfect examples. In the
five week battle on Iwo Jima 80,000 Americans battled while 6,281 died and 19,000 were
wounded. 15 On the Japanese side 21,000 soldiers died basically all during the battle. At
Okinawa, in two months of battle about 13,000 Americans died while 36,000 were wounded and
about 70,000 Japanese soldiers were also killed. 16 Looking at these numbers it would be quite
shocking that the battle for the Japanese mainland would cost 500,000 American lives. These
battles were bloody and the Japanese fought very bravely but there was no way that anyone can
justify saying that they saved 500,000 lives by dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. It is very possible that Truman felt the need to exaggerate these numbers to fully
justify this terrifying weapon. Despite whether it was the truth or not, most Americans believed
these justifications. It was either this bomb or the loss of so many more sons, fathers, and
husbands. Even though it is common memory that the bombs ended the war, there are other
facts that indicate otherwise.
One of the most interesting questions to consider when speaking of the bomb is whether
it really was the deciding factor in ending the war. In the summer of 1945 the Japanese military
was poor in weapons, ammunitions, and personnel. 17 Their capabilities to make war were so
diminished that if an invasion ever occurred, it would be very difficult for the Japanese to put
15
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together a fighting force to adequately defend their home island. It was also clear from a
declassified document released in 1989 that Truman knew that Japan wanted to surrender. 18 If
Truman and his advisors knew this, then what was the point of using such a catastrophic
weapon? It is also documented from an intercepted message that Emperor Hirohito wanted to
reach out to the allies to stop the war as early as July 12, 1945. 19 President Truman was notified
of all this information and in his private journals; he referred to this as the “telegram from (the)
Jap Emperor asking for peace.” 20 Now it is clear that the President knew that Hirohito wanted
peace but still decided to drop the bomb. Hirohito was simply looking to find a way to surrender
without more suffering for his people. His challenge was to break the news to the Army Group
who like so many other Japanese soldiers, would rather die than surrender. 21 The fact that
Truman ignored this gesture, even if it was just an intercepted message is baffling because one
would think he would not want to drop the atomic bomb and kill innocent people. The Emperor
desperately wanted to surrender also because he thought he would receive mercy and be able to
keep his title as divine leader of Japan. 22 As German war trials were beginning, the thought of
the Emperor’s divine title being taken away from him and even being executed had to be
somewhat of a concern. It is clear, however, that Japan was somewhat willing to negotiate with
the Allies before the thought of a Soviet invasion was even possible. The message was
originally intended for Stalin because the Emperor thought the Russians might be easier to
negotiate with if the Japanese gave up territory in Asia. 23 As we will learn, the influence of the
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Soviet Union might have been very significant in the decision to drop the bomb because of their
declaration of war 5 days before the Japanese surrender.
In President Truman’s dealings with Joseph Stalin at the Potsdam Conference in July of
1945, it was clear that he knew about the USSR’s plan to enter the war in the Pacific and Japan’s
desire to surrender. At this point, Truman did not know that the atomic bomb would work so the
next best option was to ask the Soviet Union for help. Truman’s journal on July 18, 1945 reads
“Discussed Manhattan. Told Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M of telegram from Jap Emperor
asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe the Japs will
fold before Russian comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland.
I shall inform about it at an opportune time.” 24 It is clear that Truman was confident that the
Japanese would surrender before the Soviet Union even felt compelled to declare war. Also,
Truman knew of the successful test of the atomic bomb in New Mexico and already appears
determined to use it. At this point it looked like it did not matter what happened in the next
month or so. Truman was going to use the bomb and the USSR’s entry into the war or the
Japanese pending surrender were insignificant to him. Again, why drop the bomb if the Japanese
will surrender? Many historians also theorize that just the shock of a Soviet invasion might have
forced the Japanese to surrender.
Stalin told Truman he would enter the war against Japan and this seemed like reason
enough not to drop the bomb, but yet, the tragic event still occurred. He also had officially
promised to enter the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany, which was a
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target date of August 8th. 25 As we know, however, the Japanese military strength was dwindling
rapidly and American planners believed just the shock of a Soviet invasion might force the
Japanese to officially surrender. Even at the beginning of the war the Japanese leaders knew that
it would be impossible to successfully battle the Soviets as well as the Americans and the British
at the same time. If Japan’s military leaders acknowledged this in 1941, there was certainly no
hope for a successful defense in the summer of 1945. Truman also has made it clear that his
main reason for even attending the Potsdam Conference was to make sure that Stalin and the
Soviet Union were going to enter the war against Japan. 26 Even though Truman thought the
bomb would be made by then, he wanted to make sure that the Soviet Union was willing.
Obviously, if Russia entered the war, then many American lives could also be saved. From
Truman’s lost journals we can also tell he knew that once the Soviet Union entered the war, the
Japanese wouldn’t stand a chance: “Fini Japs when that comes about.” 27 From this quotation it
is clear that Truman was confident in immediate victory once the Soviet Union decided to enter
the war. History books remember that the war ended due to the atomic bombs over Japan, and
the mushroom cloud has long been the lasting image of the war, but the Japanese did not know
of the bomb’s existence and thus were solely concerned with a possible invasion of their
homeland.
In reaction to the first Atomic Bomb dropped on Hiroshima on August 6th, 1945, the
Japanese leadership simply reacted with urgency and not panic. The next day on August 7th the
Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo sent a coded message to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow
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with another request for mediation and negotiation for a possible end to the war. 28 There was no
answer but on August 9th the USSR declared war on Japan and attacked Manchuria. Now there
were many new problems for Japan, including the thought that an occupying Soviet force in
Japan would never allow an Imperial system in Japan to continue. 29 The most viable option at
this point was be to surrender to the United States and not the Red Army. On August 9th the
Japanese Supreme Council met to discuss the option to surrender when the second atomic bomb
on Nagasaki dropped. 30 The official surrender came on August 14th, five more days later. It is
very possible that the Japanese leadership wasn’t too concerned with the loss of civilian life. At
Okinawa alone, about 80,000 Japanese civilians were killed. Also, civilians on Kyushu were
instructed to sharpen bamboo sticks and meet the Americans at the beaches if an attack was
coming. 31 From this information it seems as though when pinned against the wall Japan would
use everything at their disposal to defend their homeland and keep fighting, even if it meant
sacrificing civilians. After the dropping of the bombs the odds just seemed too much for the
Japanese due to the oncoming Soviet invasion in addition to the immense cruelty of the atomic
bombs.
Even though the atomic bombs that were dropped over Nagasaki and Hiroshima were
catastrophic and cruel, Japan had seen cruel bombs earlier in the incendiary bombs. In March of
1945 Americans dropped hundreds of incendiary bombs on Tokyo and many say that more died
from these fireballs than those at Hiroshima. 32 Obviously, Tokyo was much more populated
than the 350,000 people who lived in and around Hiroshima. Furthermore, over 60 other cities
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were completely destroyed by the time of August 1945. Japan’s homeland had definitely been
devastated as a result of the war, so the devastation of the atomic bombs is not the sole reason
that they did not surrender. The country had experienced a lot more devastation than the
American public realized, and if Japan didn’t surrender after 60 cities and Tokyo were bombed,
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not going to be the only reasons to surrender.
This is just another factor that many people do not realize when analyzing the end of the war.
The mushroom cloud will always be the lasting image of 1945 and the end of the war, but it is
not the reason that Japan formally surrendered to the United States 11 days later. It was a
combination of factors including the oncoming Red Army and the desire to keep the Empire as
much intact as possible including the placement of the Emperor as the divine leader.
One of the lesser known and alternative theories as to why Truman decided to drop the
Atomic bombs was simply revenge on Japan. The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and killed
thousands of innocent people, and they had committed atrocities such as the Bataan Death
march. When Truman’s announcement became public, many new outlets across the country
cheered the decision and applauded the bomb’s ability to swiftly end the war. 33 That is the
reaction that one would expect in the United States. It had been five long years of war in which
thousands had been killed overseas. When the papers, news outlets, and the public found out
that Truman had apparently ended the war with one bomb, the public felt that they were in debt
to this man. For example, the Washington Post declared that the bomb was justified: “a struggle
to the death commits all combatants to inflicting a maximum amount of destruction on the
enemy within the shortest amount of time.” 34 The paper further said that it was “unreservedly

33
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glad that science put this new weapon at our disposal before the end of the war.” 35 Many of
these same reactions spread across the country pretty quickly. Although no images of the ground
were available, people saw the images of the mushroom cloud above Hiroshima and the pilots of
the Enola Gay stated that they hit their target directly.

36

Immediately after the war a poll was

taken nationwide and only five percent objected to using the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Fifty-four percent backed Truman’s decision and an astounding 23 percent were
disappointed that more bombs didn’t drop before Japan had the chance to even surrender. 37 This
information tells us that four times as many members of the public were in favor of dropping
more bombs than those who didn’t back Truman’s decision to drop any. Even though there were
no more bombs available at the time it seems as though the public were in favor of punishing
Japan for what they had put America through. The war had brought so much joy to people that
not many thought to question the military’s morality.
After the war it was outrageous for members of the public to raise questions about the
dropping of the atomic bombs. “To raise questions about Hiroshima is to raise doubts; it seems
to some, about the moral integrity of the country and its leaders.” 38 Americans did not know
what these bombs did to the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki due to the secrecy, suppression,
and distortion of the American military and government. The reluctance of the American public
to believe that we committed an atrocity could have also been a factor. The Japanese at first did
not even know how to handle the “ghost parade that was occurring in and around Hiroshima. 39
The “ghost parade” referenced the thousands of people still alive who were doomed to die due to
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radiation sickness. Many relief workers went into the city without any idea what was happening,
and immediately got sick. At first, this sickness was small but it quickly spread and killed many.
A Tokyo news service soon reported that the city might be inhabitable for 70 years due to the
damage. 40 As the death toll among the initial survivors skyrocketed in the following weeks,
American military leaders first thought it was just a ploy to win over support or sympathy. 41
This might have been the response relayed to the public but in reality the military was working
hard to decipher whether the areas would really be dangerous especially for an American
occupation force. Even though war-time censorship had officially been ended on August 15th,
any documentation or images regarding the bombings on Hiroshima or Nagasaki were strictly
forbidden. 42 The United States was doing public relations work to make sure the harmful effects
of the bomb stay hidden as long as possible.
This effort was somewhat thwarted when an Australian newsman named Wilfred
Burchett was able to report on some of his experience witnessing the area around Hiroshima just
four weeks after the bombing. When Burchett arrived and as he reported, he was constantly
watched and told exactly where to go. At one point Burchett witnessed fish in one of the rivers
turning their stomachs upwards and then dying a few seconds after. When Burchett approached
an American official with this news, the official simply said that Burchett had obviously
succumbed to Japanese Propaganda. 43 Hiroshima was mandated as an out of bounds area for
journalists and every reporter was subject to checkups at the hospital during their stay. When
Burchett learned that his white corpuscle count was down, hospital officials attributed it to a
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knee infection even though Burchett later learned that a knee infection would have increased the
number of white corpuscle numbers. 44 Furthermore, when the checkup was done with Burchett
found that all the pictures from his camera had been erased and was no longer allowed to report.
Even so the only reports that men were getting were carefully edited and American monitored
interviews. The typical response by a Japanese citizen was “we were defeated but we hope the
Americans will be as good winners as we were losers.” 45 Even though Burchett was unable to
recover his photographs he did make the ground breaking report that shocked the public
worldwide.
Burchett got around the American authorities and eventually made it to Hiroshima
station, where he was able to observe the catastrophic effects of the bomb. Burchett took out his
typewriter amidst the rubble and ash and began to write: “In Hiroshima, thirty days after the first
atomic bomb destroyed the city and shook the world, people are still dying, mysteriously and
horribly- people who were uninjured in the cataclysm from an unknown something which I can
only describe as the atomic plague.” 46 Burchett when on to describe the haunting feeling that
was felt because of the smell, and the complete emptiness of Hiroshima. Before this report on
September 5th, no one had any idea of this “plague” and there was basically zero viable
information coming out of Hiroshima. The story was picked up by thousands of news outlets
worldwide and the “atomic plague” soon became one of the most discussed topics in the world.
After the story hit, General Douglas MacArthur even ordered all reporters out of Tokyo. 47 The
United States military and censoring effort was ready to counter as well.
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After Burchett’s story hit newspapers worldwide the U.S military went to work on crisis
control. On the same day the story hit on September 5th, Secretary of State James Byrnes
released a report of hundreds of atrocities committed by the Japanese. 48 Included in these stories
were accounts of American soldiers being decapitated, eaten, and buried alive. Times Magazine
even observed the timing of the report as something “not missed by many readers.” 49 It was
obvious what James Byrnes and the American government was trying to accomplish here. They
were blatantly trying to justify the circumstances and the decision to drop the atomic bombs by
pointing the finger at Japanese atrocities. Washington had a plan to counter the stories coming
out of Hiroshima and this was just one of the tactics displayed. Events in Japan were not the
only occurrences that had to be censored, as tragedies occurred on United States soil as well.
One of the more revealing events encircling the dangers of radiation was the risk of
workers in America coming down with radiation sickness. On September 21st, 1945 a worker on
the bomb project since 1943 named Harry Daghlian died suddenly in an “industrial accident.” 50
The report was suspicious because it was reported five days after the death and there was no
description as to how the “industrial accident” occurred. It was years later that it was actually
revealed that he was actually a physicist who was responsible for handling mass amounts of
plutonium and observing chain reactions. The accident was actually Daghlian dropping a 13
pound tungsten brick on top of an enclosed structure containing already critical plutonium. 51
After the incident, he felt sick and the symptoms all pointed to radiation sickness. The military
hid the real nature of his death twenty days later after the accident because they wanted to make
more bombs and were frightened how the public would react if they heard the real dangers of
48
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radiation and nuclear fission. The official policy in the coming decades was a suppression of the
effects of radiation. This secrecy would have a cost for the thousands of residents, soldiers, and
scientists who were unknowingly exposed to the radiation from test sites.
General MacArthur even censored the news outlets in Japan. As discussed above he
made all news outlets submit their stories to a censorship board and all newspapers were banned
from revealing they were being censored. 52 This made sure that readers had no idea whether
they were receiving the real story or not. For the next four years news outlets in Japan were
censored and books as well. Before 1949 the atomic bomb and its effects were not discussed by
major media outlets or in print. In four years of censorship only four books and one poem were
published mentioning the bombings over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 53 The only reason stories
from people like Burchett were released is because the Japanese helped him get to the bomb
epicenter because they wanted him to see what “his people” had done to the Japanese and the
city. 54 Unfortunately for the American military one of these books entitled “Hiroshima” by John
Hersey became incredibly popular in the United States and blew the lid off any censorship effort.
This incredible work will be discussed in the next chapter. From all of these findings, it is clear
that the American military didn’t want anyone talking about the radiation from the atomic
bombs, including the victims.
In this chapter plenty of evidence has been presented disregarding Truman’s simple
explanation that the bomb was dropped to save allied casualties. Truman knew he wanted to
drop the bomb well before he even learned that the Soviet Union was going to join the war in
early August. If this was to impress the Soviet Union or to show the world the power of the
52
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United States military, we may never officially know. It is clear though that saving allied lives
was not the only motivation and Truman claiming the bombs had saved half a million lives is
also ridiculous and a much exaggerated number. We also learned that it’s possible that the
dropping of the bombs might not have even really motivated Japan to surrender. It is more likely
that they surrendered because of the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria on
August 8th. Furthermore, after the bombings we know that there was jubilance in America due to
the end of the war and then a cover up by the military and government concerning the effects of
the bomb and the “atomic plague.” Overall, Americans dealings with the atomic bomb were all
unnecessary because the USSR’s invasion of Manchuria could have shocked Japan into
surrendering. The whole cover up and censorship would not even have been needed if Truman
did not decide to drop these cruel bombs on the civilians of Japan.

Chapter 2: Stimson, Truman, and John Hersey

In the last chapter many different topics were discussed including why Harry Truman
decided to drop the atomic bombs, the feelings in America after the bombs were dropped, the
16

military cover up of the real physical effects of the bomb, and perhaps some flaws in Truman’s
logic that was presented to the public. One of the arguments offered was that Truman’s true
intentions were to use the bomb the moment he learned that the bomb had been successfully
tested in New Mexico. In this chapter, Harry Truman’s life and feelings over the decision will
be much closer examined. Did he ever have any doubt? Did one of the most decisive military
decisions of all time ever get to him or make him feel remorseful? These are all subjects that
will be explored in this chapter. Additionally, in the last chapter I touched on the initial
discovery of radiation sickness and how this bomb was obviously different from an incendiary
bomb or any other explosive ever created. When it first struck no one knew what was happening
and why people were dying weeks and months after August 6th. When John Hersey’s article first
appeared in the New Yorker it sent shockwaves across the United States. It was a truly eye
opening account that let Americans see the terror that the atomic bombs unleashed on thousands
of seemingly innocent people. This article was very significant because it finally presented
radiation sickness to the public and humanized the Japanese people that were affected by these
cruel bombs. In reaction to this article Henry Stimson and Harry Truman wrote articles
defending the decision to drop the bomb. It was unprecedented for politicians to react to a
magazine article but that just speaks to the influence the Hersey article had on the public’s
perception. We will look at both of their reactions and how their explanations compare with the
reasons we stated in the first chapter. Overall, 1946 to 1950 was an important time in America
as it refers to perceptions of the atomic bombs.
First, it is important to relay how the American public was feeling before the Hersey
article came out on August 31, 1946. As I discussed in the first chapter, the American public
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favored the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 55 After the bombs, 85% of Americans
approved of the bombings while just 10% disapproved and 5% had no opinion on the matter. 56
This was not too surprising, however, because it is expected that Americans would be ecstatic
about the war just being over. It did not matter how it got accomplished, but the fact that all the
men were coming home to their families and that there was peace on Earth for now, made so
many Americans approve of the bombing. Directly after the war, it would be difficult for
Americans to differentiate the question of “do you approve of the bombs” or “do you approve the
fact that the war is over?” It is for this reason that these numbers are not surprising, and there is
another factor to consider.
The American perception of the Japanese during the war was that they were barbaric and
cruel fighters that committed numerous atrocities. The memories of Pearl Harbor were still fresh
in the public’s mind, and those painful memories would not soon be forgotten. Due to this
perception, Americans justified the constant incendiary bombing and again at first did not have
much remorse about dropping the atomic bombs. Also, almost a year after the bombs had been
dropped, Americans had learned very little about the negative effects that the bomb had on the
public due to radiation. 57 With the release of John Hersey’s “Hiroshima” on August 31, 1946,
everything changed.
The Hersey article was one of the first pieces of work released that gave Americans a
chance to see the complete devastation and terror that these bombs unleashed on seemingly
innocent victims. This issue of the New Yorker was visibly different from other issues because
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there was no “talk of the town segment,” or any cartoons. 58 The entire issue was solely
dedicated to a 68 page long article by a 31 year old war correspondent named John Hersey. This
article was supremely unique because rather than describing the destruction of the landscape and
buildings, this piece looked at the pain felt by people who fell victim to these catastrophic
bombs. People reading these accounts could also identify with the people being described in a
way they could not before the article. 59 This quote by Yavenditti shows exactly the effect this
article had on the American public: “For perhaps the first time since Pearl Harbor, thousands of
Americans confronted Japanese who were ordinary human beings and who manifested few of the
stereotyped Japanese warrior traits of fanaticism and sadism.” 60 It was an unprecedented task to
think of these Japanese sadists as ordinary human beings.
John Hersey does a good job at the beginning of the article describing the innocent and
hardworking nature of one of the Japanese citizens he followed. “Miss Sasaki, who was about
twenty, had to cook breakfast for her father, a brother, a sister, and herself, and since the
hospital, because of the war, was unable to provide food to prepare a whole day’s meals for her
mother and the baby, in time for her father, who worked in a factory making rubber earplugs for
artillery crews.” 61 Describing a family like this and the hard work they put in just to get by did a
very convincing job of humanizing them and making them relatable. They certainly did not
seem like harsh savages from this account. This article made the entire public relate to these
people and visualize the same things happening to a city in America. This instantly made the
question if we should have dropped the bomb a heated debate in the United States.
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This article also gave Americans a chance to truly visualize what happened on the day the
bomb hit and the days after. It covered the initial fire storm, the lack of medical services, the
confusion and surprise of the cities inhabitants, and the intense fear that came with this attack.
The instances of the article that described the sheer terror were moving and disturbing. “The
eyebrows of some were burned off and skin hung from their faces and hands. Others, because of
pain, held their arms up as if carrying something in both hands. Some were vomiting as they
walked.” 62 The book also describes even more terrible things such as hollow eye sockets, puss
covered wounds, and skin freely peeling off peoples bodies. It was truly a horrific read and one
would need a strong stomach to get through it all. In addition to all the gruesome details, Hersey
added various examples of heroism, sacrifice, and ultimately survival.
One of the most powerful messages sent from this article in the New Yorker was the
realization that this could happen to an American city if more of these bombs would be
developed. The dread and fear of facing a weapon like this started many debates in the United
States and in the coming decades. This dread was not fully realized in 1946 because it was clear
that the United States was the only country to possess this weapon. In fact, at the time there
were no other bombs in existence because Truman had used the only two that were ready for
detonation. The government did however want the world and the public to think that they
possessed many bombs and they could be used at any time. In any fashion, Americans were
convinced through Hersey that this sort of bombing was more destructive than any other weapon
in the history of mankind.
Raids on the centers of certain populations were considered routine in the eyes of the
American public, but Hersey’s “Hiroshima” forced Americans to realize that this was the new
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war horror. One of the most terrifying aspects of these bombs was that it could come without
any warning. In “Hiroshima,” Hersey describes that most citizens had no idea such an attack
was coming, and all they thought they saw that morning was a few reconnaissance planes. 63 The
confusion when this bomb hit was overwhelming because no one had any indication that one
plane could cause this amount of devastation. Even though there was a rumor going around the
city that the Americans were planning something special for the city, no one could have
anticipated something as horrific as what the citizens of Hiroshima endured on August 6th. 64 In
this case, there was no warning and no chance for a majority of the city to seek shelter. Even if
they had that chance, it probably would not have helped as thousands died trapped under poorly
constructed Japanese buildings. The bombing changed warfare because the common visuals
from the war were hundreds of planes causing mass destruction, but now warfare had the
capability to destroy cities with just one or two planes. It was a complete and utter shock to the
American people. This bomb changed everything and the article by Hersey was supremely
popular and is one of the few works in history that required a reaction from government leaders.
It is without a doubt that John Hersey’s “Hiroshima” was one of the most popular
magazine articles of the 20th century. From the moment it hit the newsstands on August 31, 1946
it was an immediate sensation and newsstands sold out almost immediately. Even the major of
Princeton, New Jersey asked every citizen to pick up a copy. 65 The ABC network read the entire
work four nights in a row because the demand was so high for the article. 66 The New York
Times famously declared that any American that “permitted himself to make jokes about atom
bombs, or who has come to regard them as just one sensational development that can now be
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accepted as part of civilization…ought to read Mr. Hersey.” 67 This message by the New York
Times explicitly tried to reach the people who did not know the truth behind the destructive
power of the atomic bombs. Furthermore, most people who read it were moved and began to
doubt the government’s reasoning when they decided to use the bomb. It was in this sense that
this article held its power. The quick spread and popularity of the article almost required a
response from higher government, but there were also many that questioned Hersey’s intentions
in writing “Hiroshima.”
Even though the Hersey article was tremendously popular many readers in the American
public lashed out and claimed that “Hiroshima” was just a propaganda tool used to make
Americans feel bad about the use of the bombs. Critics thought that this sort of sentiment might
cause the disarmament of the United States if the hype over the article continuously increased.
Many claimed that this was the kind of movement that would decrease American defenses, and
then would lead to less homeland security. 68 Some even claimed that disarmament was the
reason the United States started off so poorly at the beginning of the war. On top of these claims
some critics also simply stated that war is terrible and the atomic bomb was just another
example. Some thought that these particular bombs equaled the horror and complete terror that
constantly surrounds the state of war. In the last chapter it was discussed that the United States
military tried to make the atomic bomb feel more justified by releasing a list of numerous
atrocities committed by the Japanese. For some members of the American public, this tactic
worked because some felt that since the Japanese were barbarians and were so ruthless during
the war, they deserved this sort of treatment. 69 This reaction is not surprising because over the
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last four years the American public constantly received the message that the Japanese were brutal
beasts that would do anything to kill Americans and citizens alike.
Overall, how it is possible to justify the mass killing of innocent civilians that had
practically no involvement except for the very few who worked in military factories? For many,
the deliberate act of killing civilians was a subject that concerned many Americans after the
Hersey article appeared. 70 The argument in this sense is can the military ever justify sacrificing
an innocent civilian in favor of saving an armed member of the military? Is that moral? “No
human life is so sacred that it ought to be spared at the cost of destroying by positive, deliberate
act another human being who is not culpably accountable as unjust aggressor or as sentenced
criminal.” 71 This is a very logical argument that has not truly been touched on in the debate.
The general debate always seems to surround the cruelty of the bomb due to the radiation and the
mass terror and pain it brings to so many. To my knowledge, the conflict has rarely been about
whether which life is more valuable, the lives of soldiers who would die invading mainland
Japan or the citizens who died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I think this is a crucial issue that
must be examined.
At a quick glance there is no debate because citizens should never be harmed when a
soldier can instead be put into harm’s way. A soldier is supposed to enter conflict to protect
civilians and to protect them at all costs. Some think that a citizen should never be involved in
war no matter the circumstance because it is an unwritten law among belligerents. “Promiscuous
attack upon armed and unarmed alike-upon men, women and children, upon great concentrations
of ordinary human beings who in overwhelming majority are objectively convictable of no
70
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belligerent status-is, with that same tradition, to be rejected, whatever may be the alternative.” 72
This is a very convincing argument that Truman, Stimson, and other leaders decided to bypass in
favor of a swift and decisive end to the war.
Soon after the release of John Hersey’s “Hiroshima,” the men in charge of the United
States government felt that it was necessary to justify their decision to drop the atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two men who were most responsible for the decision to drop the
bombs were the Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President Harry Truman. The first public
statement released to the public following the release of the John Hersey article was Henry
Stimson’s essay entitled “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” which was released in
February 1947. 73 We will never know if it was released at Truman’s request or not, but
nonetheless the former Secretary of War attempted to reassure all Americans that the decision to
use the bomb was justified and not made easily. It is truly amazing that a single newspaper
article could incite this reaction from higher government but John Hersey’s “Hiroshima” was and
remains today one of the most influential and groundbreaking essays in American military
history. For all its efforts, Hiroshima was not even the number one bestseller in 1946 as the
honor went to “The Egg and I,” a comedy about life on an Oregon farm. 74 Thus, it is difficult to
say how significant “Hiroshima” was to the American public.
The origins of Stimson’s article entitled “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” started
with the urgent request by James Conant. 75 This man was one of the people who got the
Manhattan Project on its feet, and he was very concerned with the public’s reaction to the Hersey
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article after its release. In a letter to Stimson’s special assistant Harvey Bundy, he expressed his
concern for a repeat of criticism after this war just as there was after World War I because many
thought the United States wrongly entered that conflict. 76 Conant’s simple request was that
Henry Stimson write an article “clarifying what actually happened with regard to the decision to
use the bomb against the Japanese,” as to not have a distortion in history for future generations. 77
Obviously, Conant did not want the history books to say that the United States government made
a quick and rash decision that killed thousands of innocent lives just so that a few American
soldiers did not have to die. Forgetting what the reasons were behind the motivation for this
article, the fact that men like James Conant were urging Stimson and Truman meant that the
Hersey article had reached the highest level of government.
Henry Stimson’s article “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” clearly clarified the
government’s motivation and obligation to use the atomic bombs in August 1945. In the
beginning of the article Stimson thoroughly reviews how the bomb was planned and
manufactured through the Manhattan Project. He stated that both he and Franklin D. Roosevelt
were well aware of the dangers associated with constructing a weapon with such destructive
power, but it was war and they must unlock all the possible doors to victory. 78 When President
Roosevelt passed away Stimson filled Truman in on all the details associated with the bomb’s
construction. Stimson and Truman also organized an Interim Committee that advised the
President on all decisions associated with the use of the atomic bombs. 79 Responsibilities of this
committee also included the drafting of statements following the dropping of the bombs, the
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containment and control of atomic energy worldwide, and domestic control of atomic energy. 80
One of the committee’s most significant contributions to the decision to use the bomb was that
on June 1st 1945 they declared that the bombs should be used as soon as possible on Japan
without prior warning. 81 The committee and Stimson claimed that the alternatives would be less
productive in bringing a swift end to the war.
The primary reason for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, according to
Stimson, was that there was indication that Japan would fight to the very last man. This
information motivated the United States government to find an alternative to invading Japan.
Invading Japan’s homeland would be disastrous according to Stimson. “In such an event the
Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men
and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its
ability to fight literally to the death.” 82 As I explained in the last chapter, Stimson and Truman
cliamed that an invasion of the homeland of Japan would result in over a million deaths and the
war would be estimated to last until 1946 or later. In a memorandum written by Stimson for
President Truman, he outlined the current military situation in the war against Japan, and
highlighted that an alternative to this invasion would be most necessary. Some of the advantages
at the time were that Japan had no allies, their navy was basically destroyed, the allies had air
superiority, and great moral superiority being that the United States was the victim of Japan’s
initial sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. 83
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One of Stimson’s most interesting messages in this memorandum was that he discussed
the general attitude of the Japanese population. He believed that the country was not full of
military fanatics, and if the Japanese could be convinced that the war was over, then maybe it
could come to an end without a full out invasion. 84 It was in this context that Stimson suggested
a warning to Japan for full demilitarization or else. This warning was issued on July 26th and
came to be known as the Potsdam Ultimatum, since it occurred after the Potsdam Conference. 85
The Japanese promptly rejected the Ultimatum, warranting it “unworthy of public notice.” 86 The
decision was then made for the atomic bomb to be used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August
6th and 9th, respectively.
In this article by Stimson, he attempts to convey his compassion for the Japanese people
by stating he rejected the proposal to also bomb Kyoto. “Although it was a target of
considerable military importance, it had been the ancient capital of Japan and was a shrine of
Japanese art and culture.” 87 One of the purposes of writing this article in the eyes of Stimson,
Conant, and Truman was to make the American public feel as though their government had felt
compassion and had not been reckless in this huge decision. It is very possible that Stimson
added details like these to try and convey that to the public. However, the ultimate justification
for the use of such a weapon was the fact that it ended the most horrible war in human history.
Stimson claims that ending this war as quickly as possible and with the least amount of
casualties was his sole mission. When addressing the bomb’s critics at the end of his article, he
explains that war is death and it is inevitable. “The face of war is the face of death; death is an
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inevitable part of every order that a wartime leader gives…But this deliberate, premeditated
destruction was our least abhorrent choice…It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockage;
it ended the ghastly specter of a clash of great land armies.” 88 Henry Stimson accomplished his
objective in writing this article. He did his best to justify the slaughter of a hundred thousand
Japanese, most of them civilians. At the time, this was the best way to do that. The most
common message that is mentioned many times is the concept that they had no other choice.
Also, Harry Truman’s input on the matter is rarely discussed and perhaps this occurred at his
request. Even though President Truman stated he had no regrets after the bomb was dropped
initially, is it possible for one not to feel remorse or pain after making a decision of this
worldwide magnitude? It is definitely clear that there was some anxiety later on in his life even
though he initially stated he made the right decision.
After the bombs were dropped in August 1945 Truman remained firm in his and the
government’s decision. In some off the record comments with a reporter soon after the
bombings Truman declared that “when you have to deal with a beast, you have to treat him like a
beast.” 89 Also, after Robert Oppenheimer publically stated that it was a “known sin” for him to
take a part in the construction of the bomb, Truman said that confession was just another
example of a “crybaby scientist.” 90 This statement is interesting because it was first
Oppenheimer that put Truman in the position to use the bomb. In these two quotations it is very
clear that Truman initially had no remorse or at least very little for the Japanese or anyone who
felt that the government made the wrong decision.
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Truman was one of the most burdened by this decision and it showed in the rest of his
Presidency as well. Following the death of President Roosevelt, Truman often doubted his
power and his own ability to make adequate decisions. “His frequent expressions of self- doubt,
together with his unprepossessing appearance, greatly troubled some of his advisors. At one
point General Marshall even specifically warned him that he must, as commander in chief, be
careful not to appear weak.” 91 If his ability to make decisions was questioned before the bombs
were dropped, it is predictable that he would doubt those decisions. Being the President after
one of the best Presidents in the history of the United States brought certain pressures and this
included the ability to make a tough decision that was ultimately in the best interest of the
country and world peace. In short, if he did not truly have confidence before the decision, it
would be easy to see Truman struggling with it after. However, immediately after the decision
Truman did his best to defend the decision and convey that it was a necessary one to end the war.
There are many people nationwide that believed Harry Truman took such a harsh stance
because he was protecting himself from his true feelings over his decision. Just as many
Americans attempted to do before the release of John Hersey’s “Hiroshima,” it is very possible
that Truman was numbing himself and ignoring the moral questions associated with the atomic
bombs. 92 There is a point to be made that the ability to make this decision coincides with the
same ability to separate oneself from the horrific human consequences that came with it. If
Truman had fully come to grips with the devastation and suffering he had unleashed, then living
out his days in confidence over the decision would become very difficult. When Truman
actually saw images of the destruction in Hiroshima, he started to face the fact that Hiroshima
was not just a military base.
91
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After the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it is clear that Harry Truman felt guilty
over the decision for most of his life. In 1948, Truman acknowledged the devastation and the
gravity of such a decision on his own conscience. “That was the most terrible decision that any
man in the history of the world had to make…I never want to have to do that again my
friends.” 93 It is obvious that after being shown photos of the destruction and the lives
extinguished by a single bomb, Truman was affected.
Despite the controversy in Truman’s own mind, he had to make one of the toughest
decisions that a leader will have to make. He and the American government, in one way or
another, slaughtered thousands with just two simple orders. In the 20th century no United States
President has come out and publically opposed the bombing due to the possible damage it could
do to the government’s credibility. The overall defense of the government is that the bombing
was done with much remorse but was ultimately necessary in securing a quick resolution to the
most terrible war in history. Over the next 20 years or so Truman distorted the numbers in his
head to make it clear that he had saved thousands if not millions of lives. In 1955 he claimed he
had saved a half million American lives, while in 1959 “millions of lives,” and in 1963, 125,000
American lives and an equal amount of Japanese “youngsters.” 94 In this chapter many topics
have been discussed such as reports on how many lives the bomb actually saved, but throughout
the 20th century it was just commonly accepted that the bombings saved upwards of 500,000
lives, but that was far from the case.
The debate and controversy surrounding the decision to drop the bomb is one of the most
heated and relevant in the history of the country. In the 21st century, nuclear technology and
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weapons of mass destruction are at the forefront of the human mind because of the mass
devastation and terror it could cause. It is interesting to wonder if the only reason another one
has not been used yet is because the world has seen the terror that can be unleashed when they
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Is it possible that Truman’s decision to drop
the bombs has further cautioned future leaders to think twice about making the same decision?
This is definitely a question to consider as new technologies are produced in the 50’s and 60’s.
Furthermore, the tension between Soviet Russia and the United States grew to a very high level,
and atomic bombs became the focus and largest dilemma for both nations. One of the center
questions that needs to be answered is what did the bombings accomplish? Was it just the end of
the war or was something else achieved?
This chapter has explored the impact of the Hersey article and the reactions from the
highest level of United States government. These were all examples of short term impacts of the
dropping of the most terrifying weapon created in human history. As we move out of the two or
three years after the war we will see how the bombs impacted the start of the Cold war, and the
spread of this deadly technology. One of the most relieving aspects in the time right after the
war for Americans was that the United States was the sole possessor of this type of bomb. In the
50’s this thought changed immediately as the Soviets acquired the technology. The terror of a
possible nuclear war would soon set in.
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Chapter 3: The Origins of the Cold War, the Hydrogen Bomb and the Cuban Missile Crisis

After the war ended, it was very clear who the two superpowers of the world were: the
United States and the Soviet Union. Almost immediately after the war there was tension
between the two nations over how the war ended and how the future would turn out for both
nations. Stalin was most certainly jealous over the American’s crown experiment that resulted in
the invention of the most powerful weapon ever created. This tension and ultimately fear turned
the late 40’s and 50’s into an arm race and the eventual development of the hydrogen bomb as
well. Furthermore, when many scientists of the original Manhattan project noticed the urgent
32

desire by both nations to produce massive amounts of atomic weaponry, they surprisingly
objected to it, because they thought it would lead to the end of mankind. The ultimate scare of
the 20th century was, however, the Cuban Missile Crisis. Since many declassified documents
have recently been released, citizens in both nations can get a better sense of actually how close
we were to a nuclear war. This 1962 standoff between Soviet and American forces is famous for
just this, and was handled very well by both President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. If
these two leaders did not show the restraint to make the order to push the button, we very well
could have seen another war break out in 1962.
First, it is important to investigate the origins of the Cold War and how this tension led to
this near disaster in 1962. It is interesting to argue that the mere presence of the atomic bomb in
the world between 1945 and 1991 was the most responsible tool for peace. 95 “When we think of
the diplomatic history of that era, the bomb features as a blunt, fearsome tool: a brutal means of
ending the Second World War, and then of deterring war between the United States and Soviet
Union.” 96 It is for these reasons that fear might have been the most influential feeling in the mid
to late 20th century. The Hiroshima article by John Hersey and all the other publications released
describing radiation sickness and its horrible effects, spoke volumes to the entire world. It is
foolish to think that Soviet and American leaders were also not distinctly affected by these
gruesome images and stories. No one wanted to be the one responsible for unleashing that kind
of horror upon the world and its innocent civilians. It would completely make sense for the
nations of the world to come together after the war to make sure that another world war is
prevented, and the atomic bombs be regulated. Another world war with the use of atomic
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weaponry could certainly doom the world. 97 Instead, the two most powerful nations of the world
went in opposite directions and the tension grew with every month after the war.
One can argue that the United States was primarily responsible for the beginning of the
Cold War due to its aspirations in the latter half of the war to establish a new world order based
on American interests. Roosevelt and Truman had this attitude because the United States was
superior to the feuding European nations who had devastated the world’s population by
unleashing two deadly world wars. 98 These two men, however, soon learned that the Soviet
Union did not want to play by the Americans rules and so the confrontation between the two
nations began. 99 It is also worth mentioning that in 1946 American’s believed they to have a
monopoly on the Atomic bomb, which at the time was true. This power over the world could
have had an influence on international policy making and their intentions to lead the world into
the second half of the twentieth century.
The American view of themselves as the dominant nation of the world infuriated Stalin to
a point where he felt compelled to build the atomic bomb. Stalin believed that the United States
would use the atomic bomb as a tool to simply make U.S foreign policy more assertive. 100 He
was most disgusted with the fact that the Americans thought they could use the bomb as a ploy to
make the Soviet Union feel under them. Nonetheless, the fact that the Americans had the bomb
and the Russian’s did not angered Stalin and created the image that the Soviet Union was not the
most dominant nation in the world. It is important to note that Stalin did not think the United
States would use the bomb against the USSR at the time. This was a big risk but Stalin stood by
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it. After the victory in the war, the Soviets no longer wanted to be labeled as the technologically
backward society of the world. 101 The label as inferior to European nations and the U.S was a
brutal reminder of Russian past and Stalin was determined to erase it. This was obviously not
the only factor that motivated the Soviet Union to build the bomb, but definitely contributed to
the resistance to cooperate with Western Europe and the United States.
Even though Stalin was determined to build the bomb to equal the technological playing
field, he at first did not think it was a weapon that could be used in standard warfare.
Furthermore, Stalin thought that another world war or a war between east and west was not a
threat for some time. 102 He did, however, believe that another war was inevitable, just not in the
foreseeable future. He saw it this way because both armies were not completely capable of war
at the time and no one wanted to dive back into war after the most deadly war of all time. Also,
Stalin only saw the bomb as a weapon of fear, and he thought they had no real military
significance. “Atomic bombs are meant to frighten those with weak nerves, but they cannot
decide the outcome of war, since atomic bombs are quite insufficient for that.” 103 It is interesting
that Stalin made these comments, given that he wanted to build a bomb very badly after he found
out that the Americans had one. The official reason for his need to have a bomb was mostly
political. The fact that the United States had the bomb and the Soviets did not weakened Stalin’s
position in politics and negotiations. 104 At this point in history, it was perceived that the balance
of power in the world was based on who had the atomic bomb and who did not.
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Even though the Americans apparently had the advantage in international affairs due to
the bomb and allies in Western Europe, Stalin and the Soviets attempted to project as much
power as they could in Europe and Asia. Again, Stalin was resolute in his dealing with the west
because he seriously doubted that anyone would want to or be capable of another conflict so
soon after World War II. 105 In the months after the war had ended, Stalin and Soviet Foreign
minister Molotov continued to not be frightened by U.S intimidation tactics. At one point in
London, U.S Secretary of State James Byrnes even openly threatened Molotov with an atomic
bomb, but Molotov considered it an empty threat. 106 It seemed as though the two powers grew
more resentful towards each other as each day passed following the end of the war. The United
States attempts to control international policy failed because Stalin and the Soviets were not
going to be intimidated even if they were directly confronted with an atomic bomb. As the days
pressed on, the scientists who created the bomb and knew its power grew very concerned with
this ever growing conflict.
The scientists who built the bomb and knew of its power not only were witnesses to its
ability to kill, but also its ability to destroy mankind. 107 One of Robert Oppenheimer’s most
serious concerns was preventing the spread of the weapon. He desperately wanted international
control and he felt responsible for the thousands of deaths caused by the two atomic bombs. In
November 1945, he met with Truman and stated famously, “Mr. President, I have blood on my
hands.” 108 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Truman assured Oppenheimer that the
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appropriate steps were being taken to internationally regulate the bomb and later referred to him
as a “crybaby scientist.” 109
Many scientists started to ponder the possibility of an apocalyptic end to the world due to
these bombs, before the majority of the world even knew they existed. In their minds, the
symbol of the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima was not an image of victory, but a source of
knowledge that had terrible potential. 110 This knowledge of responsibility for many of these men
gave them overwhelming feelings of guilt. Some scientists after the war were walking the streets
of Chicago and could not help but look up and “vividly imagining the sky suddenly lit by a giant
fireball, the steel skeletons of skyscrapers bending into grotesque shapes and their masonry
raining into the streets below, until a great cloud of dust rose and settled over the crumbling
city.” 111 These images haunted many of these scientists because they knew if the Soviets built
the bomb, this could very well happen in their lifetimes. The thought of the atomic bomb being
used against the United States was a thought that drove the fear of the Cold War. Many
American scientists could not bear the thought of something so terrible happening due to their
own creation. Many of the scientists who were involved campaigned for arms control and a
nuclear test ban to prevent the weapon from ever being used again. 112 Obviously, most of these
plans were unsuccessful, but it is worth mentioning that the most educated and experienced men
in the world when it came to nuclear energy were the most active in preventing its spread.
Phillip Morrison even referred to Hiroshima as a “crime and a sin,” not because it ended the war,
but because it was “the first event of a future that’s intolerable.” 113 It was clear that the majority
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of these scientists were consumed by the thought a nuclear war ending the civilized war as they
knew it, and then they all would have more than just blood on their hands.
American scientists even tried to reach Soviet scientists to warn them of the dangers
associated with building the bomb. Albert Einstein, Robert Oppenheimer, Irving Langmuir, and
Harold Urey sent a letter to the leader of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but the letter was
immediately reported to Molotov. 114 The American scientists were preaching the message of
“One World or None.” 115 Unfortunately for the American efforts, the Soviet scientists could not
undertake independent projects and were tied to the wishes of Molotov, and ultimately Joseph
Stalin. The drive for cooperation between the two nations was a lost cause from the start due to
Stalin’s determination to create an equal playing field in international relations, and the United
States resolve to be the single dominant power in the world.
The ultimate cause of the start of the Cold War was in fact the two superpowers’ decision
to refuse international cooperation. This tension between the two superpowers was partly caused
due to Stalin’s ever harshening stance on international policies. For the majority of Russian
history, it was tradition to conduct “power politics” and never back down to any foreign
power. 116 Stalin also followed another Russian tradition of being distrustful of international
diplomacy. 117 Russians had never been very trustful of the west, and these thoughts were
justified even more when the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. Russian
statesmen had long been convinced that western diplomacy was designed to fool and embarrass
Russia. Also, those historical feelings were part of the Marxist-Leninist view that the Soviet
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Union was the lone socialist power in the world, and the capitalist west would always be on a
mission to destroy them. 118 The point is that the Soviet Union in 1945 was probably one of the
most resistant nations to international diplomacy in human history. Overall, the conflict between
the two states was inevitable due to the two nation’s unwillingness to cooperate with each other.
This was a terrible moment in history for those who thought the Second World War would be the
war to end all wars. 119 Instead of disarmament and peace, the Cold War and a new nuclear race
had begun.
After the war, the highest priority for the Soviets was building an atomic bomb. It is
clear that nothing could have persuaded Stalin to stop research and construction of nuclear
weapons. As mentioned before, he never wanted to be in the weaker technological position from
a military standpoint. On September 23rd, 1949 Harry Truman announced the explosion of Joe I,
the first Soviet atomic bomb. 120 The realization that the Soviets had a bomb was obviously a
concern, and Truman’s monopoly on atomic energy was officially over. Many American
officials, including Truman, did not expect the Soviets to have this success so quickly, and the
next fear was that the Soviets could not be that far away from building a hydrogen bomb. 121 The
consensus in the American government was that the only way to ensure American security was
to green light an all- out effort to build the hydrogen bomb. 122 In October 1949, the United
States officially approved a plan to expand the production of plutonium and uranium. 123 At this
point in history nuclear supremacy was the most important part of diplomacy.
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There are some including David McCullough who suspected that this decision by Truman
was just as difficult as the one he made in August 1945, and many did not see the hydrogen
bomb as a weapon that could approve homeland security. Truman left no written accounts
behind about the decision to approve the H-bomb so it is difficult to assess how much he
struggled with it, but we do know that others in government were conflicted. The General
Advisory Committee for the Atomic Energy Commission was made up of prominent scientists
including Robert Oppenheimer, and they recommended building atomic bombs that could
actually be used in battle instead of the construction of hydrogen bombs. 124 These bombs would
much less powerful than a super bomb. Building these smaller bombs meant using small
amounts of tritium to promote the efficiency of these bombs.
The committee recommended using these smaller bombs because they wanted the United
States resist the inclination to research a super bomb. One of the arguments made was that the
bomb could only be used for mass destruction. 125 The hydrogen bomb would have no military
use, and required tons of tritium, which was expensive to make. The second reason was that it
would not approve national security. 126 The arguments by the committee made it a point that
this bomb would solely be a weapon of genocide and would not benefit humanity in any way.
They simply considered it an “evil weapon in any light.” 127 This decision can be considered one
of the most important in nuclear history due to what followed.
This decision to build the hydrogen bomb was considered so significant because “it
carried military destructiveness into the realm of an infinite end.” 128 This new research was also
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alarming because there was no limit to how large a hydrogen bomb could be, unlike atomic
bombs. Also, it is interesting to consider the public perception of Truman if he did not further
this research. Would people think he doubted his original decision to drop the bomb? Backing
out of atomic research could have hinted that Truman did not approve of dealing with atomic
weaponry. The United States also thought this was the only way to maintain their perceived
dominant stance in the world. The view was that being without this technology left us
vulnerable to the Soviets. Overall, a Soviet H-bomb would be an intolerable situation for the
government. 129 The debate was now focused on whether the future of civilization would be
determined by the outcome of the Cold War and the rise of more super weapons.
At this point in history, the world was hell bent on creating weapons that could be used
for mass death and destruction. The most gifted and intelligent men on the planet were
dedicating their working lives to make these bombs that no one ever wanted to see unleashed.
Wasting economies and priceless resources was probably one of the worst decisions of the 20th
century because building these weapons did not bring any more control or any less fear to the
world. “That nuclear weapons proliferate and the superpowers exhaust their economies
attempting to outmaneuver each other to unattainable dominance demonstrates how irrationally
tenacious is our hold on traditional forms of control.” 130 In the 50’s the only “form of control”
was draining as much effort, money, and manpower into the further development of super
weapons. This development also changed how warfare would be conducted in the future.
In the 50’s the conflict between science and government expanded due to that the bomb
rendered every country nearly defenseless. The scientific discovery completely changed military
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conflict and the dangers of entering a war with another superpower. Richard Rhodes put it best
in simply stating “the thickest shields, from fighter aircraft to Star Wars, could be penetrated by
merely by multiplying weapons, decoys and delivery systems.” 131 Military strength and pushing
other nations around no longer worked. The only defense against the nuclear armed world would
be strictly political. 132 Negotiation, delegation, and an open world with cooperating nations
would be the most efficient way to keep peace. The nations that did not cooperate would then
sink into an arms race, and unfortunately the Cold War was just that. We will see during the
Cuban Missile Crisis that political negotiation and mutual reluctance for a nuclear conflict
probably saved the world.
The Cuban Missile Crisis put the world on the brink of nuclear war, and many do not
know how close the Soviet Union and the United States were to all-out war. The origins of this
conflict start with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. In May of 1962, Nikita Khrushchev was
looking for a way to counter the United States lead in development of strategic missiles in
Turkey and he wanted to protect Cuba from another invasion. 133 Khrushchev and the Soviets
gained Fidel Castro’s permission to secretly start building missile silos and installations on the
island of Cuba. 134 Eventually on October 15th, United States recon photos spotted the missile
installations and what followed was a week of threats, exchanges, and tension felt by the entire
world. As we will see, there were many exchanges between John F. Kennedy and Nikita
Khrushchev that assured a peaceful ending to a conflict very close to American shores.

131

Rhodes, 783.
Rhodes, 783.
133
Library of Congress Archive, Revelations from the Russian Archive Cold War: Cuban Missile Crisis.
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html (July 22, 2010)
134
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/colc.html
132

42

One of the first things considered by the United States government was what the
consequences would be if their military invaded Cuba. Furthermore, they had to consider why
the Soviet Union was doing this. In a CIA Special Intelligence Estimate done on October 20th,
1962, five days after the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the CIA theorized why the Soviets
had put missiles on the island. “A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to
demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no
longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even in its own hemisphere. 135 The
perception by the CIA five days into the conflict was that this was a random unprovoked move
of aggression by the Soviet Union to scare the United States and show their power not only in
Europe, but in the western hemisphere as well.
The CIA also came to the conclusion that the Soviets intentions were to use the missiles.
A public withdrawal of that kind of firepower was certain to upset Fidel Castro and make the
Soviets look weak in the western hemisphere. 136 Therefore, the CIA concluded that the Soviets
would either end up using these weapons, or if they were not confronted they would keep
increasing presence on Cuba and in the western hemisphere. 137 The United States also had to
consider the effects of not confronting the Soviets very soon. The CIA was very concerned that
a lack of authority over the area could mean lost United States influence and control over many
Latin American countries. 138 One of the last things the United States government wanted was to
look strong armed by the Soviets, and leave the possibility open for more communist regimes to
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arise in Latin America. There were many different options that the CIA suggested that were
thought not to provoke a nuclear response.
One of the first options considered was just a warning to Castro and the Soviets. A
general warning to Khrushchev was not predicted to stop the deployment, but instead it was
likely to begin negotiations between the two nations that could perhaps stop a military
conflict. 139 The one concern that the CIA had with this option is that negotiations with either
Castro or Khrushchev could simply give the Soviets more time to build up more weaponry.
Also, any warning would eliminate the possibility of surprise if an American attack was
necessary. 140 One of the next options considered was a blockade of Cuba so that the Soviets
could not ship any more arms to Cuba. The risk in doing this was that if the Soviets attempted to
bring shipments to Cuba, there was always the possibility of a violent standoff that could
culminate in war. 141 This option was not seen by the CIA to accomplish much but delay and
make negotiations a possibility.
The last and most grave option was an all-out attack on the island of Cuba. This strategy
was most certainly going to provoke a response from the Soviets because they would not expect
it and definitely would be alarmed. Also, no response from the USSR would make them look
weak and that would not be tolerated by men like Nikita Khrushchev. There was also the
possibility, however, that even if the Soviet Union did leave Cuba in light of an American attack,
and they could attack after that from another unknown location. 142 It is worth noting that the
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CIA was speculating on all of the possible outcomes, if the United States chose to unleash any of
these options.
In an October 21st meeting with President John F. Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara made it clear that a military attack on Cuba was possible within a weeks’ time. 143
The mobilization of these troops would begin during President Kennedy’s national speech to the
public the next day, and transportation vehicles would be ready for the invasion within one or
two days. 144 General Sweeney also outlined how the military installations and Soviet missile
silos would be taken out by aircraft. From this document we can see that the American
government was making every preparation to take out the Soviets by force. One of the concerns,
however, with this attack was that General Sweeney was not completely sure that he could locate
and destroy all of the missiles. This would leave the United States vulnerable to any missile silos
or installations that they did not destroy. The results of this meeting were that the President said
the military should be ready to unleash the attack. Kennedy asked the Attorney General for his
opinion and his one concern was that this would be a Pearl Harbor like attack, and thus responses
from the Soviets would be unpredictable. 145 These men were right to think that retaliation could
be coming because that was the most likely scenario.
Fidel Castro made it clear in a letter to Khrushchev that if the Americans attack, the
Soviets should retaliate in the most brutal fashion. In the beginning of the article which was
written on October 26th, Castro tells the Russian Premier that he thinks an American attack is
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imminent in the next 24 to 48 hours. 146 From the Cuban perspective, he says that they will do
everything in their power to resist and confront the enemy. As for the purpose of the letter,
Castro blatantly does not think there should be any debate on what to do from the Soviet side if
the U.S attacked. “I tell you this because I believe that the Imperialists aggressiveness is
extremely dangerous and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of
international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever
through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be, for
there is no other.” 147 From this passage and the language used by Castro we can see that he
would have no moral restraints from using the most terrible weapons created to counter an
American attack of Cuba. As we will see, the world is very lucky that Khrushchev was slightly
more hesitant than Castro to unleash that sort of terror on the world.
In a letter responding to Castro on October 28th, Khrushchev assured the Prime Minister
that he and Kennedy are working towards an agreement that will make sure Cuba is not invaded
by the U.S again. 148 He also requested that Castro show patience and firmness in the midst of
this crisis, until an agreement can be made. Nonetheless, these correspondences showed that
Castro was in fact the one that was more inclined to go to war than Khrushchev. Again, it seems
that the only men who were confident that they could find a peaceful resolution were
Khrushchev and Kennedy. Many on the American side also favored an invasion of Cuba.
Throughout the process of going over different scenarios with top military and
government officials, President John F. Kennedy remained dedicated to negotiations and the
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hope for peace, even when many of his officials wanted to attack Cuba. Top officials and the
CIA thought that either an air strike followed by invasions would be the best action while some
thought a military effort built around a blockade and reconnaissance was also feasible. 149 A
political approach was all but eliminated but the President suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
that they wait for the Russian response and not do anything too hastily. 150 Kennedy was one of
the only ones who wanted to act with restraint before making a decision that affect the future of
humanity and the lives of millions. In fact, the President was told by intelligence that if the
United States waited to strike, then the Soviets would have time to hide the missiles. 151 The
President decided to continue negotiations instead of green lighting an air strike. He even
addressed the Chief of Staff General Earle Miller by saying “I know that you are your colleagues
are unhappy with the decision, but I trust that you will support me in this decision. 152 This was
said on October 20th so the conflict would not come to an end for another week, yet the President
was clear in his resolve to continue negotiating.
In this conflict, it was ultimately the negotiating resolve of both Khrushchev and
Kennedy that led to further peace. On October 26th, 1962 Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy
that assured the United States that the Soviets would dismantle all missile installations in Cuba if
they simply assured that they would never invade Cuba. 153 Kennedy decided to accept this
proposal even though negotiations continued including concerns over the Soviet light bombers in
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Cuba and the American missile installations in Turkey. Even today as we have access to all of
these documents, it is amazing how close we actually were to a nuclear war.
One of the most telling documents of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a Soviet order to their
men in Cuba giving them full authority to fire a nuclear weapon if they felt threatened in any
way. This order was sent on September 8th, 1962 by Malinovsky and Zahkorov to the leaders in
Cuba stating “you are permitted to make your own decision and to use the nuclear means of the
Luna IL-28 or FKR-1 as instruments of local warfare for the destruction of the enemy on land
and along the coast in order to achieve the complete destruction of the invaders of the Cuban
territory and to defend the Republic of Cuba.” 154 This is a very shocking order because it was
sent more than a month before the Americans even knew that Soviet missiles were being built in
Cuba. Overall, it shows that if we actually sent an air strike to Cuba or invaded, it is very likely
that these men would have launched nuclear weapons against the United States and a nuclear war
would have started.
Even though it was a close call, the conclusion to the Cuban Missile Crisis can definitely
be seen as a victory for peace and prevention of nuclear conflict. After the majority of the
conflict was over on October 29th, 1962, political assistant Arthur Schlesinger wrote a
memorandum to the President summing up the conflict and theorizing what it meant for the
future. 155 In this memorandum, Schlesinger rationalizes how war was prevented and what it can
mean for the future. One of his main points is that firmness in dealing with the threat worked
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well and that route will definitely have to be taken in the future. 156 Also, the Soviets will now
expect any other intrusion into the western hemisphere with the same stern and firm reaction.
Finally, he hoped that the Cuban Missile Crisis marked an end to a struggle by both powers to
overturn world power, and maybe it could start a drive for further peace in the world. “The
Cuban Crisis, we hope, marked an end and a beginning, an end to the violent adventures
designed to overturn the equilibrium of world power, and a beginning of fresh initiatives for
peace, including a new attack on nuclear testing, disarmament, overseas bases, and on world
social and economic problems.” 157 An overwhelming majority of the world probably hoped the
same as Mr. Schlesinger.
The increased focus on nuclear testing and the eventual standoff between the two most
powerful nations in the world were both immense moments in nuclear history. The continued
development of atomic energy was largely motivated by the desire for both nations to be the
dominant force in the world, and it grew into the birth of the hydrogen bomb. Then, the Soviet
Union and the United States had come dangerously close to starting a nuclear war, but the
resolve of two leaders probably saved the world. It was a very vital time and the world had
survived without another catastrophe.
Chapter 4: The Ripple Effects of Hiroshima and the Atomic Bomb in modern times

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, there seemed to be less tension between the Soviet Union
and the United States. Since 1962, there has never been a threat as severe and close as that crisis,
but the influence of the atomic bomb is still very much present in modern society. As we know
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today, the technology of weapons of mass destruction has spread too many corners of the globe
and many new nations now have the capability to conduct a nuclear attack. In the United States,
the original debate over Truman’s decision to drop the bomb still has had a lasting impact proven
by the Smithsonian controversy. When the Smithsonian National Space Museum put up an
exhibit on the bombings, a controversy erupted when the Japanese were portrayed as innocents.
Obviously, raising questions about the decision was still very controversial in 1995. The
presence of radiation and its hazards is an important ripple effect left by Hiroshima. The
Chernobyl disaster proves that nuclear radiation is incredibly dangerous and that the bomb is not
the only way nuclear energy can be harmful. In today’s world the nuclear bomb is present in
many parts of American culture including movies, literature, art, television, and video games. In
most of these cultural depictions of the bomb, it is seen as a weapon that has the ability to end
the world. This means that the use of nuclear weapons can mean the apocalypse, for not just
humans, but for all life on earth. Whether true or not, that realization is a key part to the legacy
left by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis, there seemed to be less tension between the
Soviet Union and the United States. In 1963, President Kennedy gave a speech at American
University, where he urged Americans to reexamine Cold War stereotypes. 158 Kennedy also
called for a strategy for peace, which was shown in two additional ways. After the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the international hotline between Moscow and Washington D.C was
implemented. 159 This meant that there was now a direct telephone line between the Kremlin and
the White House. Kennedy’s most influential words, however, came here: “For in the final
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analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the
same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.” 160 This quotation truly
shows that Kennedy portrayed he was going to do everything he could to prevent another nuclear
standoff, and any possibility of a nuclear war. As it goes, the tension between these two
superpowers really did seem to be lower, but the threat of a nuclear bomb was always present.
Later on in the later part of the 20th century, it was still a topic worthy of discussion by evidence
of the Smithsonian controversy.
The memory of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has remained a controversial
topic, even after the Cold War. This controversy showed itself in 1995 when the Smithsonian
National Air and Space Museum attempted to put up an exhibit on the atomic bombings of
Japan. The exhibit entitled “Crossroads: The End of World War II, the Atomic Bomb, and the
Origins of the Cold War,” was centered on a restored version of the original Enola Gay, the
plane that dropped the bomb over Hiroshima. 161 The museum simply attempted to show the
history of one of the most significant decisions in the history of warfare on its 50th anniversary,
but unfortunately the exhibit sparked all kinds of controversy. A typical description by a critic of
the exhibit came from the Washington Post’s Eugene Meyer who claimed that the exhibit was an
“anti- nuke morality play in which Americans were portrayed as ruthless racists hell bent on
revenge for Pearl Harbor, with the Japanese as innocent, even noble victims fighting to defend
their unique culture from Western Imperialism.” 162 Many critics thought that if children saw the
exhibit, they would no longer think of their grandfathers as heroes, but as bloodthirsty, racist,
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and even criminals. 163 Obviously, many veterans were not happy with this possibility because
one would think that America would be celebrating the 50 year anniversary of the war. Many
veterans viewed this as the exact opposite of that. Unfortunately, much of the problems with the
script of the exhibit were that it could easily be misrepresented.
The authors of the exhibit did not attempt this controversy upon them, but some of the
script in the exhibit could have been improved. One of the most famous lines from the exhibit
script read: “For most Americans, this war was fundamentally different than the one waged
against Germany and Italy- it was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend
their unique culture against Western Imperialism.” 164 It is easy to see how many people were
outraged including the Washington Post’s Eugene Meyer. This sentence clearly makes it out to
seem that the United States had it out for the Japanese, and they had done nothing to deserve this
onslaught of Western Imperialism. It is also worth mentioning that these sentences were not
completely untrue, but they were so easy to misinterpret and to take as offensive. 165 The truth
was that the war on Japan was not unprovoked due to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
Recently, declassified documents on the Bataan Death March hardly made the Japanese seem
like innocent victims during the war. 166 Despite the true intentions of these words to celebrate
the end of the war, many critics continued to see the exhibit as a way of providing sympathy for
the Japanese. Overall, raising questions over the decision to drop the bomb was ultimately the
act that wouldn’t be tolerated.
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Since the bomb was dropped the official justification was that it was used to save a
million lives and to shorten the war. What infuriated so many about this exhibit was that it
raised questions over that decision by making the Japanese look like innocent victims. 167 In
hindsight most of the people killed in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were civilians,
so this is partly true. This sentiment still would not be tolerated even fifty years after the war
ended. Ultimately, almost 50 years after John Hersey’s article and all the questions, the
government and war veterans had to deal with the same controversies due to this exhibit. This
exhibit adequately presented the complexities that came along with the decision to drop the
bomb and all the controversies behind it. Was this a war crime? Was dropping the bomb
motivated by racism? Was it revenge for Pearl Harbor? The only justifications for the decision
that the American public had heard, was the information given to them by Harry Truman and the
rest of the government.
Another one of the reasons that this exhibit brought so much controversy was the myth
that the Americans were the heroes of the war, and we would never commit the crimes that the
Nazis or the Japanese did during the war. In other words, the veterans and critics of the
Smithsonian were aiming to use the exhibit to celebrate the triumph of the Americans in the war
and further the myth that Americans are the heroes of the world. 168 This is a disappointing
realization because even though the script in the exhibit had some obvious problems, it could
have been used to reflect on the convergence of victory with triumph. Part of the purpose of this
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exhibit was recognizing that ending the most deadly war of all time came at a cost of many lives
due to the atomic bomb. 169
Overall, the collective memory of World War II to the American public was that it was
the U.S.A’s finest hour and we fought the “model war.” 170 The U.S.A was instrumental in
defeating both the Nazis and the Japanese, both deemed as evil. Sherwin puts it best by stating
“in Europe we defeated a nation of fascist maniacs who were infected with racial madness and
hell bent on dominating the continent. In Asia, we destroyed a power crazed military machine
that had bombed, raped, and plundered Koreans, Chinese, and Southeast Asians, in addition to
attacking, without a declaration of war, the U.S Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.” 171 This is the
mindset that most Americans had fifty years after the war. We were the moral ones who put an
end to much of the world’s tyranny and horror. Also, in addition to defeating them, we also fed
them, helped rebuild their countries, and provided the building blocks to democracy. 172 From
the collective memory of Americans, we stood for good and humanity and fought what many
thought to be the model war. Considering any other possibility was unthinkable for the majority
of the American public who thought that their fathers and grandfathers had done everything for
the sake of justice and good.
The critics of the exhibit demanded drastic changes that would have included descriptions
of the Japanese atrocities and the removal of every word or document that was critical of the
atomic bombs. 173 Organizations like the American Legion and the Air Force Association also
wanted the statement “to this day, controversy has raged about whether dropping this weapon on
169

Dower, 339.
Martin J. Sherwin, “Memory, Myth, and History,” Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifshultz, (eds.) “Hiroshima’s Shadow”
(Stony Creek, CT: The Pamphleteers Press, 1998), 344.
171
Sherwin, 344.
172
Sherwin, 344.
173
Sherwin, 350.
170

54

Japan was necessary to end the war quickly,” be completely removed. 174 Obviously, these
organizations and some others wanted there to be zero controversy surrounding the dropping of
the bomb. Many of the Smithsonian officials felt barraged by all of these requests, and were
unaware that the exhibit would bring so much controversy. The curators and the staff of the
museum, however, read the script for a second time and saw some justification for some
misunderstandings. 175 The Museum put out one revision, and then another, but both attempts
were met with more criticism and more demands for revisions. 176 Eighty one Congress people
even sent letters demanding further changes to the exhibit.177 The Smithsonian was now facing
hearings in the Congress and the Senate, threats to the Museum’s budget and the looming loss of
funding if the exhibit continued to be shown. Finally, on January 30, 1995 the exhibit was
officially taken down forever.
The Smithsonian Controversy showed that even fifty years after the war had ended, there
was definitely still a sensitivity to the decision, and no one wanted to be reminded of the
controversy that had festered in the late 40’s. Veterans of the war and many government
officials still clearly did not want any questioning of the United States morality during the war
because it had been planted in our minds that we fought for humanity and the right thing. We
defeated the tyrannical and racist forces of the world and we did it the correct way, without any
fault against us. This controversy was eye opening because one would think that fifty years later
Americans could open themselves up to the debate, but that was definitely not the case. In
addition to the Smithsonian there have been many other more serious incidents that have opened
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the public’s eyes to the danger of nuclear war and research. One particular event in the Ukraine
opened up the worlds eyes to the dangers of nuclear research.
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 is the only nuclear accident in the history of commercial
nuclear power where people died directly due to radiation. 178 The direct result of this accident
was the deaths of 30 people and many more deaths that may or may not have been caused to the
disaster. At a nuclear power plant in the northeastern Ukraine, a steam explosion occurred at a
releasing at least five percent of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere. 179 Two
workers died that day because of radiation sickness and 28 more died in the following weeks. 180
Many people attribute the disaster to poor design of the plant and faulty handling by the workers,
but nonetheless it is a very important incident because it showed people that atomic research
could kill without the form of a bomb. The fallout from this catastrophe was said to be the
equivalent to the damage from an atomic bomb as well.
Soviet administrators scrambled to figure out what directly caused the problem because
the accident caused millions of people around the world uncertain about their health and the
safety of nuclear research. In a sense, there was no way administrators could be sure that another
or many other like this one could not occur all over the world. 181 The mistakes that led to the
accident were just simple routine errors that definitely could occur again. The worry was that
there was no definitive way to prevent this from happening again. Even though plenty of the
radiation dispersed in the atmosphere, experts agreed that the damage of the accident would
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equal the long term effects of a bomb dropped 20 years before. 182 While the Soviets were
struggling to deal with the real effects, another issue presented itself soon after the accident.
Overall, the fear that resulted after this disaster was immense and felt globally. Part of
the reason for this was that immediately after the disaster some rogue newspaper decided to
publish statements saying that the death toll was climbing into the thousands or more, due to the
spread of deadly radiation. 183 This set off an explosion of fear all over the world. “Throughout
Europe, even thousands of miles from the Ukraine, people doubted the safety of their food,
mothers worried about whether they should let their children play outside, and temporary
residents pulled up stakes to mover farther away.” 184 It is amazing how bad press can impact so
many lives because many of these people were in no danger at all, yet this disaster in the Ukraine
had much of the world watching what they ate and where they went. Many European nations
even played it safe and imposed restrictions on select food items. 185 It was clearly impossible for
the public to sort out the real problems from the imaginary ones. It was very obvious, however,
that wherever there was news of a nuclear accident, fear was very close behind.
The reality of the recovery and cleanup of this disaster was still one that involved
thousands of people. Almost 200,000 people took part in the cleanup from all over the Soviet
Union. 186 Many of these individuals were exposed to the radiation during the cleanup, but none
more than the one thousand or so that were involved in the effort during the first day of the
accident. Also, there was a massive resettlement due to the dangers of the radiation. Over
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220,000 people were forced to resettle originally out of a 30 km radius exclusion zone. 187 Over
time that zone was extended and in total covered over 4000 square kilometers. Since the disaster
many animals have returned to the area, but high radiation levels remain.
The Chernobyl disaster is but one of the impacts that nuclear technology has had on this
planet. The accident shows that one slight mistake by a few workers could have global
consequences. Also, radiation in the atmosphere is not something that can simply be cleaned up
and erased. One mistake could mean consequences for a very prolonged period of time. Many
people around the world now believed that nuclear reactors posed a direct problem to the future
of life on this planet. Nonetheless, the Chernobyl disaster was a groundbreaking moment in
nuclear history because of the 30 fatalities and the future effects the accident had on the area.
This was the first radiation related deaths that were not associated with the making of the bomb
or the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world was now fully aware that atomic
energy was just as destructive through radiation, than it was in the form of a bomb.
On top of the concerns over nuclear power plants, waste, and the possibility of more
accidents, the spread of nuclear technology all over the world was another development that the
world had to face in the 20th century. The nuclear proliferation was another factor that
contributes to the constant fear that Americans and other democracies have. It only takes one
nuclear weapon in the hands of the wrong people to start a nuclear war that could threaten all of
humanity. During the Cold War, it is obvious that Americans were primarily concerned with the
Soviets and rightly so, but in the 90’s and into the 21st century there are many other hostile
nations that have reportedly acquired the atomic bomb including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
Part of the fear that this comes with is the fact that Americans started this phenomenon with the
187
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Manhattan project. Even though the Cold War is over the threat of a nuclear attack remains very
real for a majority of American citizens.
Recent events such as the emergence of terrorist networks and the concerns over North
Korea and Iran prove that there will always be the threat of a nuclear attack. This danger of this
has only increased due to the breakup of the Soviet Union and their loss of nuclear materials. 188
However, the spread of nuclear arsenals should not be blamed on outside sources. As explained
in the last chapter, it was the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 40’s that decided that
the only way to be safe was to win the arms race and obtain nuclear supremacy. Today it is clear
that no one wants a nuclear apocalypse, which should mean disarmament instead of further
development of atomic weaponry. “When we admit that the weapons cannot be used, then we
can discuss whether they can be eliminated, or reduced to a minimal number, perhaps fewer than
one hundred, that would no longer threaten global destruction.” 189 This is a problem we face
today because it does not seem we are anywhere close to complete nuclear cooperation. Solving
this problem would eliminate the possibility of the end of the world by nuclear means.
Unfortunately, Hiroshima signified more than just the end of World War II, it unofficially
let the world know that technology could eventually destroy us. 190 We obviously did not know
this in 1945, but in the 21st century it is a realization that we all have to face. Part of what we
will encounter today is the psychological struggle to get the entire world to understand the risks
of nuclear technology. One wrong move by one nation could end up causing a world conflict
that brings about the end of the world.
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Since we dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it has always seemed as though
the power of these weapons has a certain power over us. The psychological battle under the
threat and stress of war has been the most interesting characteristic of modern conflict since
World War II. Again, this partly has to do with the fear that we associate with these devastating
weapons. Ultimately though the mere presence of having these weapons has been the best war
deterrent in existence. “We rely on them and flaunt them, but psychologically and politically
they have imprisoned us. In exploding bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki we frightened no
one more than ourselves. Ever since, we have struggled to overcome our own terror and reestablish lost security by means of embracing the objects of that terror and attaching ourselves to
their ultimate power, their omnipotence.” 191 We are prisoners to the atomic bomb’s power, and
we act like we will use them, when in reality it is the last thing that the world wants. The
destruction, pain, and longtime suffering that these bombs have caused in Japan has possibly
scared the world into recreating that in the modern day. Over time there have been many threats
to use the bomb, and that fear has continued even after the fall of the Soviet Union. 192 One can
even argue that the thought of the nuclear weapon is approaching the reputation of a protector
and a destructor. In one sense they have the potential to destroy the world and kill millions, but
they also arguably have prevented nations from starting large scale wars with each other. The
psychological aspect of possessing these weapons protects us, but the threat of other nations
building them up also represents the threat of a coming disaster.
This fear of a coming disaster has shown itself in our society during the Cold War when
most people expected there to be a nuclear war. Polls have shown over the years that a majority
of Americans would have approved the first use of a bomb in Korea in the 50’s and in Iraq in
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1991. 193 Most Americans did not approve of use of the bomb in Vietnam, but that can definitely
be attributed to most of the public did not see the war as necessary. 194 During those years of
building up these nuclear arms, the public felt less safe about the possibility of a nuclear
attack. 195 Some people created their own fears about what would happen in wake of a nuclear
attack because many did not know the specific consequences. “Ordinary people, that is,
experience their own post Hiroshima entrapment- mixtures of nuclearism and nuclear terror, of
weapons advocacy and fearful anticipation of death and extinction.” 196 The most ordinary
scenario was visions of mass death, fireballs, and dust. Part of the mystique of the bomb was
that people only associated it with mass death, so every other expectation was shady. Overall,
the age after 1945 to now can be declared an age of anxiety. It can be argued that the threat of a
nuclear war has characterized human society since World War II due to the constant fear of an
attack that could escalate into another world war. This time, however, the conflict could involve
nuclear weapons and threaten the likelihood of human survival.
Even though the threat and focus of Americans on the atomic bomb is very visible in
today’s political world, most modern politicians decide not to touch the subject. In 2011 a group
of Hiroshima schoolchildren and citizens petitioned the White House for Barack Obama to visit
Hiroshima. 197 From an American standpoint, many would assume this would just be an attempt
for the Japanese to show a President what the Americans did to their city and people. In reality,
these people in no way wanted an apology. The city of Hiroshima today is very in touch with
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their past and they do not put the blame on the United States for what happened. 198 They are
well aware of Japanese militarism and wartime atrocities during the war. The primary goal of
these citizens was to discuss how to stop the spread of nuclear weapons all over the world. 199 As
one would expect, these people held extra motivation for ridding the world of these terrible
weapons. President Obama never made the trip to Hiroshima, but it is interesting what that trip
would have accomplished if he went. A gesture like this could send a message to the world
saying that the United States is serious about nuclear arms containment.
The problem with a trip like this would be the possible backlash by Truman supporters
and the same people who forced the Smithsonian Museum into a corner. There is almost no way
a President could have the ability to visit Hiroshima without in some way admitting some regret
associated with dropping the bomb. 200 Doing this would bring the wrath of the thousands of war
veterans and organizations that unequivocally support Truman’s decision. This is a shame
because a visit to Hiroshima by the most powerful man in the world could send shockwaves
across the world and at the very least be a rallying cry for nations trying to stop the spread of
nuclear arms to hostile nations such as Iran and North Korea. There are many people in the
world that would see a visit to Hiroshima as the bold move the world has been waiting for. 201
Even though the nuclear technology is a sensitive subject in politics, it definitely has not been
that way in popular culture.
The atomic bomb’s legacy in American culture today can be seen in every form, and
shows how visible this weapon is in today’s society. Many of the most popular films in history
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have to do with the testing of nuclear weapons or a nuclear apocalypse. Most movies that have
an apocalyptic plot are usually caused by a nuclear apocalypse or World War III. For example,
the plot of “The Terminator” is that machines became self-aware and concluded that humans
were so corrupt, that they needed to be destroyed. This was simply done by the launching of
atomic bombs all over the world. Many of the James Bond movies have directly to do with
Bond desperately trying to thwart an evil organizations plan to fire a nuclear weapon at a major
city. The origin of Godzilla is the direct result of nuclear testing and mutations of lizards gone
very wrong. The film industry obviously has had its fun with the atomic bomb and it is most
commonly depicted as the easiest and quickest path to the end of humanity. Depictions of the
atomic bomb have also been included in literature, art, music, and even videogames. The very
popular “Call of Duty” series depicts the bomb as a tactical weapon that does much less damage
than the actual weapon would. Overall, it is difficult to go long without hearing a reference to
the atomic bomb in world politics or popular culture. This thesis has examined many different
angles of the bombings and how they have affected culture, politics, and life in the United States
since the end of World War II. From the decision to drop the bomb to popular culture today,
nuclear energy and weaponry has definitely been one of the most important topics to be aware of
in modern society.
In the first chapter, I discussed the reasoning behind the bomb and initial reactions
coming from the American public. Harry Truman and the rest of the government attempted to
make it clear that the bomb was dropped to save a million lives from death due to the probability
of an invasion of the Japanese mainland. As expected the first reactions were positive because
the war was over, but this reasoning was most definitely not completely warranted. There is no
way that this was the only reason because the Japanese were going to surrender in wake of the
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Soviet declaration of war. Today, the collective memory of the U.S and the rest of the world
mostly believe that the war ended due to the bomb even though that is not the case.
The second chapter explored the Hersey article and the American reactions now that the
public got a full look into the horrors of Hiroshima. The article by John Hersey opened the eyes
of many Americans and required a response from higher government including Henry Stimson.
This piece of work was vital because it humanized many of the victims and officially started the
controversy in America over we took the proper action to end the war. Even though Truman at
first remained firm in his decision, it is difficult to think that this decision never burdened him in
anyway. The events directly after the war with the Hersey article and the government reaction
guaranteed that this would be a controversial subject for some time.
Finally, on top of the difficulty in the United States, there was now the Soviet Union to
worry about. In chapter three, both of these two superpowers refused to cooperate together and
disarm and therefore there was now the threat of a nuclear conflict starting in 1949 with the
detonation of the first Soviet bomb. The argument is that this was a great opportunity to ensure
nuclear safety through cooperation, but instead both nations decided that the best course of
action for national security was to out gun the other. Initial conflicts between these two
superpowers came very close to a world war during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. If it were
not for Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy a nuclear bomb may have well been
launched that year. Even today the fear that exists in the world is immense and many think that
it is only a matter of time before a bomb is launched and humans destroy themselves. This last
chapter dealt a lot with that fear while considering other recent incidents such as the Smithsonian
Controversy and the Chernobyl accident.
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In researching American reactions and the overall impacts of the bombing on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, it is clear that this is one of the most controversial issues in the world today. The
issues and the controversy go way beyond the question of morality of dropping the bomb on two
cities in Japan during the war. The five years after the bomb are arguably the most important in
history due to the decisions the two superpowers of the world made to continue arming and not
to cooperate with each other. The Cuban Missile Crisis also is the closest we have come to a full
out nuclear war. It is unbelievable and frightening to think that we were just one mistake or air
strike away from unleashing a world conflict on United States soil. In the last 30 years there have
also been multiple incidents and controversies that have shown the true impacts of the nuclear
bomb. The Chernobyl disaster still shows that the bomb is not the only part of nuclear research
that can kill, and the Smithsonian controversy shows the conflict that still resides itself in many
Americans. Today, the atomic bomb remains one of the most polarizing and fearful weapons
ever created, and the future of this planet and human society may very well be shaped by how we
deal with handling nuclear weaponry.
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